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The appellants Summit County, the Summit County Commission 
the Summit County Planning Commission (hereinafter referred 
collectively as "Summit, i 11uiJ11 v i mil HI i I il< i ui pun all nun 
(••Utelite") , each defendants below, submit this Joint Reply 
Pi" ief , 
RESPONSE TO
 P I A I M T I F F 8 # e T A T E M E M T o g F A C T a 
This action below involved two distinct proceedings: (a) 
against Summit County resolved 
partial summary judgment . nuisance against 
Utelite resolved by a trial to both the court and the jury. 
. I U I I m i l I I n l "i -I I l i h ' I ml ii1" I  in-ui appealed from, t h e summary ji idgment 
and its effect the later trial; the plaintiffs cross-appeal 
from the result * trial. 
difference between defending the partial summary judgment and 
attacking the later verdict, To preserve the partial summary 
judgmeu 
facts found by Judge Wilkinson were not in dispute and that no 
other fact material the result was dispute obtain 
plaintiffs must marshall evidence at trial » c^ ty*r> 
verdict to demonstrate that the conclusions of the trial judge 
l 
See Willard Pease Oil and Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil and Gas Co. . 899 
P.2d 766, 770, 773 (Utah 1995); 4447 Associates v. First Security 
Financial. 889 P.2d 467, 470-71 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 
899 P.2d 1231 (1995). 
The plaintiffs have disregarded their dual relationship to 
the facts in this action. They neither address the supposedly 
undisputed material facts cited in the partial summary judgment 
nor do they marshall the evidence at trial in support of the 
verdict and findings. Rather, the plaintiffs simply re-argue 
their version of the facts demonstrating simultaneously that (a) 
Judge Wilkinson embraced a particular view of the facts in 1991 
in the face of profound evidentiary disputes, and (b) the 
evidence at trial four years later more than sufficed to support 
the result adverse to the plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FACTS MATERIAL TO THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AOAIMST 
SUMMIT COUNTY ARE CLEARLY IN DISPUTE. 
The plaintiffs' own brief unwittingly confirms the 
defendants' argument that disputes of material fact precluded 
entry of summary judgment against Summit County. To establish a 
violation of the Summit County Development Code, the plaintiffs 
attack the defendants' position that the Utelite loading facility 
("Facility") was an accessory use to the pre-existing 
nonconforming use of the property by the Union Pacific Railroad 
(the "Railroad"). They then conclude with their own factual 
determination that "[l]oading rock aggregate cannot be considered 
an *accessory use' to the nonconforming use of a railroad track." 
Appellees' Brief, p. 27. 
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The plaintiffs seek to resolve the fact issue of accessory 
use by ignoring evidence regarding s 
historic use of its Echo yard and tracks, and making the 
1,
 >"'<ni letermination i\ » a conclusory manner in their favor. 
Likewise, Judge Wilkinson decided the legal issue iMlhoul, MI 
as acknowledging the existence of essential material facts. 
before the court below was whether 
Summit County, by deeming the Facility "permitted use,M 
violated its development code with respect to r ura 1 residential 
i» ( H 1 1 1 n | III: n in nil | in i I y i i i i s c u s s e d i i i the ] ette trie 
Deputy County Attorney the plaintiffs' counsel (Appellants' 
A-8), was whether the Facility was an accessory use to the 
R.« i "i 1 1 o a d mi i Ml in I I i ( I II n ! W i i " ! I i iiiiii 11 «" i n u I m i t h a t l l n « 
Railroad's yard was a valid nonconforming use; however, the trial 
court had to determine whether the facts would support Summit 
C o u n t <r b 11 e I e i in 1 1 1 JI I i 11 I 1 1 « i II I IIIi Il 111in11 in 111 \ \ i II i i u l m • I . i n I m i i i i I i i \ t d 
cars at the Railroad's yard was an accessory valid 
nonconforming use. 
pre-exists a zoning change is unaffected by the new zoning. 
1
 i Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake Citv. 
1
 11 «l il 11 t a l i :i 9 6 7) ; Swenson v . S a l t Lake C i t v 
Or even agr icu l tura l zoning. While there i s some i s sue as t o whether 
the County correc t ly determined the surrounding zoning to be agr icul tural or 
rural r e s i d e n t i a l , that i s sue i s immaterial t o the County's evaluation of the 
nonconforming use and whether U t e l i t e ' s bui lding was a use accessory t o the 
nonconforming use . 
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(Utah 1965). Even if the Facility did not exist on the Railroad 
right-of-way at the time of the zoning change, that does not 
preclude its status as an accessory use to the pre-existing 
nonconforming use. Gibbons & Reed at 564 (,fthe entire tract is 
generally regarded as within the exemption of an existing 
nonconforming use, although the entire tract is not so used at 
the time of the passage or effective date of the zoning 
ordinance.11) . 
As argued by the plaintiffs themselves, this case includes 
issues of whether the Railroad's nonconforming use was extended 
by the installation of the Facility or abandoned for non-use. 
Appellees' Brief pp. 27-28. On the one hand, the plaintiffs cite 
evidence showing no loading at the time they constructed their 
homes; on the other hand, the defendants offered evidence that 
the Echo tracks had been used historically as a railroad yard 
which included extensive loading operations. The issue of 
accessory use is a fact-intensive question. 
The plaintiffs have not argued that the Railroad's use of 
its right-of-way is not a valid nonconforming use. They seem to 
accept the Railroad's use of the right-of-way for temporary 
storage of railroad cars.2 They did not argue before the trial 
court over the nature of the use or whether it had been 
improperly extended. That would have acknowledged the factual 
It is interesting to observe that parking railroad cars would not be 
a permitted use in a rural residential zone absent the valid nonconforming 
use of the railroad right-of-way. 
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issue. They simply made conclusory 
arguments about the zoning status and nature 
which the trial court erroneously accepted as undisputed facts. 
The I i I di I ill in it" ('"t inakiF* similar conclusory arguments as to the 
facts surrounding the issuance of the building permit. 
Appellees' Brief p. 28. The record, however, shows that Judge 
overted testimonj, of tl le 
County Building Inspector regarding the building permit R. 95. 
The building inspector testified that the Facility as originally 
cons i exempt i »«• i • i i. r e m e n t 
electrical wiring installation. R 195-96. The facts show 
that the permit was issued after construction the exempt 
portion of ti'i | r n
 (i- • t inl \i«| » » I m- i-it-< I i niblm la( i m. • 
Again, the plaintiffs highlight a factual dispute and then argue 
for their characterization of the facts. 
Judge W i i,Vinson's refusal z 
factual premises on which Summit County based its view that 
Faci II ii t} was a "permitted use" does not render those facts 
immaterial Nor does 11M |il I I I I ills' ' til  i nm I us 11 m I lliihit 
the Facility was an accessory use lonconforming use 
make the underlying facts undisputed. 
THERE IS MO MERIT TO PLAINTIFFS ' ARGUMENT THAT REMO il J I Z '1 
THE UTELITE FACILITY IS SUPPORTED BY LAW. 
The p l a i n t i f f s have p resen ted i tai. LIMI ni le^al bdiSj ,, in 
support of the appropriateness of Judge Wilkinson's order for 
nil I Ii i . The onclusory arguments are 
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misleading and not on point. Most obvious among these is the 
erroneous assertion that tfSummit County had the opportunity to 
appeal, and lost." (Appellees' Brief, p. 30.) This implies that 
an appellate court has reviewed the merits of the partial summary 
judgment; that has not happened. 
Judge Wilkinson's 60-day temporary stay language compelled 
Summit County to attempt an interlocutory appeal of the partial 
summary judgment. (Appellants' Addendum A-2 at p. 4.) At that 
stage of the proceedings with claims still pending, the attempt 
had little likelihood of success—not by reason of the merits of 
the underlying appeal, but because at that stage of the 
proceedings below any appeal was discretionary with the Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court ultimately denied the petition for 
interlocutory appeal, not because it agreed with Judge Wilkinson 
but because the summary judgment order did not dispose of all the 
issues in the case. A denial of interlocutory appeal, not on the 
merits, has no relevance to the present appeal. 
The plaintiffs provide no legal basis for their conclusion 
that "the Development Code, Utah statutes and case law all permit 
removal." Appellees' Brief p. 31. To impose such a harsh 
remedy—destruction of an expensive loading facility and 
elimination of Utelite's ability to ship product by rail—the 
court must find something more than just a debatable violation of 
the development code. At a minimum, the court must make a 
specific finding that the Facility is not an accessory use to the 
railroad's nonconforming use, i.e., that the building does not 
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belong there. Judge Wilkinson did not entertain that question of 
fact, much less decide it. The conclusory facts asserted by 
plaintiffs do not support an order for removal of the facility. 
The refusal of later judges to acquiesce in the plaintiffs' 
attempt to remove the Facility was proper in light of the facts 
as ultimately disclosed at trial. The Facility is not a 
nuisance. (Appellants' Addendum A-6.) Generally, equitable 
relief is not available where its imposition would result in 
substantial economic waste. See, e.g., Panelko, Inc. v. John 
Price Associates, Inc.. 642 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 1982). 
Further, where events have rendered the injunctive relief 
unnecessary or ineffectual, that relief should not be granted. 
Panelko at 1236. By the time of trial, the evidence clearly 
showed that Utelite had made substantial efforts to resolve the 
conditions which the plaintiffs alleged to be nuisances. The 
trial court so found. (Appellants' Addendum A-6.) An order to 
remove the Facility would not further abate alleged problems and 
clearly would amount to an inequitable imposition of economic 
waste. Judge Noel correctly refused to enforce the removal of 
the Facility. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE COUNTY 
VIOLATED THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT. 
As a threshold matter, plaintiffs' claims of violation of 
the Utah Open and Public Meetings law are barred by the running 
of the 90-day limitation period set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 52-4-8. Without specifying any supporting facts, Judge 
- 7 -
Wilkinson found that "the equitable tolling doctrine" precluded 
application of the limitation to the plaintiffs' claims. 
However, even assuming the existence of evidence to warrant 
tolling of the 90-day limitation period until the plaintiffs knew 
of facts indicating a possible open meetings violation, those 
facts clearly came to light nearly one and one-half years prior 
to the commencement of this action. Once those facts come to 
light, the 90-day limitation period begins to run. Berenda v. 
Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996); Anderson v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, 920 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah App. 1996) (statute of 
limitation begins running at the time "plaintiff first knew or 
should have known the facts giving rise to the cause of action11) . 
Simply ignoring the existence of a cause of action will not 
prevent the running of the statute of limitation. Id. 
Plaintiffs argue that exceptional circumstances existed 
which indefinitely tolled the running of the statute. However, 
the facts presented to the trial court and argued on appeal— 
"failure to provide notice . . . and to keep written minutes"— 
are not exceptional. Appellees' Brief, p. 35. These are merely 
the essential elements of the claim. The plaintiffs offer 
nothing more than this. 
Judge Wilkinson failed to address the issue of when the 
tolling ended and the statutory limitation period began to run. 
He seems to have assumed that the limitation period, once tolled, 
remained tolled indefinitely until the plaintiffs chose to file 
their suit. This certainly is not the law. 
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The plaintiffs were put on notice of the Utelite 
construction as soon as it began. They were put on notice of the 
nature of the Facility's operations as soon as Utelite commenced 
loading. Both of these occurred over a year prior to the filing 
of this action. Either fact was sufficient notice for the 
plaintiffs to investigate their open meetings claims. Their 
failure to act upon these facts does not nullify the limitation 
provisions. These claims are barred as a matter of law. 
Even if the open meetings claims were not time barred, 
Judge Wilkinson erred in finding a violation of the Act. That 
decision was based upon the premise advanced by the plaintiffs 
that Summit County made a zoning decision to allow an otherwise 
non-permitted use in a rural residential zone. However, the 
facts underlying that premise were in considerable dispute. 
The defendants offered evidence that Summit County, through 
a planning staff employee, stated to Utelite his understanding 
regarding the status of the Railroad's property and the 
appropriateness of the Facility. He sought confirmation of his 
view from the planning commission, which agreed.3 Such informal 
administrative determinations regarding whether a proposed use 
fits within existing zoning are made thousands of times every day 
in cities and counties throughout the country. Frequently, they 
This issue, like many of the others here on appeal, arises primarily 
because Judge Wilkinson ignored the fundamental disputed facts on which the 
parties based the characterization of their claims and defenses. It is 
impossible to decide the open meetings issue without deciding the factual 
issue as to the nature of the action taken by the County. 
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involve nothing more than reading a map and applying common sense 
and experience. Not one of these is rendered only after advance 
notice and public hearing. 
The issue is whether, because the staff member chose to 
discuss with the planning commission his response to Utelite's 
question, that discussion must take place only after public 
notice, listing on the meeting agenda and public hearing/ 
discussion. Ignoring the immense burden, if not near paralysis, 
this would impose on governmental operations, the plaintiffs 
argue that it must. However, the real world consequences of this 
position are absurd. 
Two examples demonstrate this absurdity. If county 
employees cannot agree on a thermostat setting and the issue 
comes before the county commission for resolution, the plaintiffs 
would require published notice, inclusion in the meeting agenda 
and public discussion of the merits of different thermostat 
settings. More analogous to the present facts, a homeowner 
wishes to know whether she can construct an improvement on her 
property. In consultation with county staff, the homeowner 
learns of the staff's understanding of those regulations 
governing of the construction. The homeowner visits with 
planning commission members to confirm the information received. 
The plaintiffs would hold the county liable for failure to give 
notice of the contact with the commission. 
If every routine, non-legislative issue discussed at a 
regular meeting of a public body requires notice, agenda 
- 10 -
inclusion and public debate, the everyday work of cities and 
counties would dissolve into a bureaucratic nightmare. Any staff 
member seeking confirmation from the planning commission that his 
or her views or actions were appropriate would have to wait until 
public notice was given. Even minor administrative issues or 
interpretations of the law would be subject to public debate. 
Every building permit application would have to be noticed for 
public hearing. No staff member could talk to a commission 
member before or after a meeting, whether or not the subject of 
the discussion was on the agenda, without fear of violating the 
open meetings law. Clearly the law does not anticipate this 
burden• 
IV. SUMMIT COUNTY DID NOT DEPRIVE PLAINTIFFS OF DUE PROCESS. 
Once again, the fundamental factual nature of Summit 
County's actions was at issue before Judge Wilkinson: Did the 
administrative interpretation and application of the zoning 
ordinance to the Facility require notice and public hearing? In 
arguing the affirmative, the plaintiffs rely on case law dealing 
with situations where local officials are acting in a legislative 
capacity to make zoning changes or enact zoning ordinances. 
Those cases clearly require notice and public hearing. 
The present case, in contrast, arose from an administrative 
determination, based on staff's interpretation of the Development 
Code, that a proposed use fell within the scope of an existing 
nonconforming use. Functionally, such a decision falls in the 
same category as deciding whether a barn is an accessory use in 
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an agricultural zone or whether a guest house is an accessory use 
in a residential zone. Both involve the application of existing 
zoning law to specific fact situations. Neither is a legislative 
zoning decision requiring notice and hearing. 
The plaintiffs have failed to establish, before the -trial 
court and here, (1) what process they are due for this type of 
administrative decision, and (2) how they were deprived of this 
process. They clearly have not made out a prima facie case for 
lack of due process. As a result, the trial court's finding that 
the plaintiffs' due process rights were violated is incorrect as 
a matter of law. 
V. BECAUSE THEY DID MOT BRING AMD PREVAIL OM A CLAIM UNDER 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S 
FEES PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. $ 1988. 
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in not awarding 
attorney's fees under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which 
provides for an award of attorney's fees to a party prevailing on 
the merits of an underlying civil rights claim. However, mere 
success at the trial court level on a state law claim for 
declaratory or injunctive relief does not establish a deprivation 
of a specific federal constitutional right pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983. Despite the grant of partial summary judgment on July 8, 
1991, and entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
August 23, 1993, plaintiffs made no reference to any federal 
constitutional allegations until the filing of plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint on March 11, 1994. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that a party is not 
entitled to recover attorney's fees under similar circumstances 
where a plaintiff obtained injunctive relief under state law 
which was not the result of a successfully prosecuted federal 
civil rights violation. ftpfoy? y» Utah State Bd. of Educ>, 858 
P.2d 1372, 1375-1377 (Utah 1993). 
VI. THE RAILROAD, AS OWNER OF THE PROPERTY OH WHICH UTELITE 
OPERATED THE FACILITY, CLAIMED AM INTEREST IN AN 
ADJUDICATION OF THE PERMISSIBLE USES OF THAT PROPERTY. 
The plaintiffs argue that the placement of the Facility on 
the Railroad's property in Echo violated the Summit County 
Development Code. Yet, the plaintiffs insist that the Railroad 
has absolutely no legally recognized interest in the adjudication 
of this alleged limitation on its use of the Echo property and, 
thus, is not indispensable to this proceeding. However, to state 
the issue is to resolve it: a property owner has a clear interest 
in limitations on the use of his or her property. 
The plaintiffs seek in this litigation to limit the 
Railroad's use of its property. The Railroad has a direct 
interest in the outcome of the litigation. 
The plaintiffs argue that the defendants failed to move to 
join the Railroad. It is the plaintiffs who may move to join. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). The defendants brought a timely motion to 
dismiss for non-joinder, the sole motion available to them to 
address their concerns about the absence of the Railroad. 
(R. 143) See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7). 
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It is further nonsensical to suggest that the propriety of 
joinder is affected in any way by a non-parties failure to 
intervene. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure set forth precisely 
what a defendant must do to raise the issue of joinder: Rule 
19(a) identifies the characteristics of a party who must be 
joined; Rule 12(b)(7) provides for dismissal, upon motion, if 
such a party is not joined. The defendants have complied with 
these rules. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
WRITTEN DISCOVERY AFTER THE ENTRY OF PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST SUMMIT COUNTY. 
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in not 
requiring Summit County to respond to discovery after entry of 
partial summary judgment. This discovery was on the very same 
factual and legal issues covered in the partial summary judgment. 
This would amount to post-judgment discovery of Summit County. 
Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways. They argue that the partial 
summary judgment against Summit County was final while attacking 
the trial court for denying them additional discovery directed at 
the very issues on which they had prevailed. 
The trial court acted within its broad discretion under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(c) to prevent the anomalous result of 
requiring Summit County to respond to a total of 21 
interrogatories and 5 requests for production of documents, all 
of which dealt exclusively with facts and legal theories 
associated with Judge Wilkinson's prior order. 
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Summit County took the position that they should remain an 
interested observer on the sidelines of the field of play. 
Plaintiffs could pursue their claims against Utelite to a 
conclusion. This would result in a final order disposing of all 
claims as to all parties and would then permit Summit County to 
appeal as a matter of right on the substantive merits of the 
partial summary judgment. 
VIII. THE PLAINTIFFS' NUISANCE CLAIM DID NOT ALLEGE CONDUCT 
SUBJECT TO A SPECIFIC STATUTORY PROHIBITION. 
This Court has held that, for conduct to constitute a 
nuisance per se, it must be "specifically prohibited by 
statute . . . .H Erickson v. Sorensen, 877 P.2d 144, 149 (Utah 
App. 1994). In Erickson. for instance, the plaintiff identified a 
reference in the Utah Code to the Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices as a statutory prohibition sufficient to 
establish a nuisance per se. This Court held that this reference 
was lfnot of the specific statutory nature required to establish 
nuisance per se.M 877 P.2d at 149 n. 4 (italics in original). 
Similarly, the alleged zoning violation in this action does 
not violate any specific statutory prohibition. The plaintiffs 
cite to Utah Code Ann. SS 17-27-7, -8, and -23 for a specific 
statutory prohibition. (Although not noted in the body of the 
Appellees' Brief, each of these sections was repealed in 1992.) 
Together these authorized the counties' adoption of an official 
map and sanctions for noncompliance with that map. They do not 
specifically prohibit the construction and operation of an 
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aggregate loading facility. Were these a sufficient basis for a 
claim of nuisance per se, any deviation from an official map 
would be actionable as a nuisance with damages being the only 
issue. This is not the law. 
IX. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO FURTHER AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT TO 
INCLUDE NEW CLAIMS AGAINST SUMMIT COUNTY AND UTELITE. 
The plaintiffs have failed to show that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying their motion for leave to file a 
third amended complaint. Not only was this motion untimely and 
calculated to produce delay and prejudice, its denial in no way 
prevented the plaintiffs from seeking independent relief on these 
separate claims. f,A motion to amend a pleading is addressed to 
the discretion of the trial court.ff Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 
1381, 1389 (Utah 1996). An appellate court will not reverse a 
denial of a motion to amend "absent a showing of an abuse of that 
discretion." Mountain America Credit Union v. McClellan. 854 
P.2d 590, 592 (Utah App. 1993). 
The trial court considers three factors: H(l) the 
timeliness of the motion; (2) the moving party's reason for the 
delay; and (3) the resulting prejudice to the responding party." 
Mountain America at 592. 
A primary consideration that a trial judge must take 
into account in determining whether leave should be 
granted is whether the opposing side would be put to 
unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated 
for which he had not had time to prepare. 
Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983). 
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The plaintiffs moved for leave to amend very late in the 
proceedings well after the entry of partial summary judgment 
against Summit County and after depositions of the parties. 
Subsequent to the entry of partial summary judgment in August, 
1993, Summit County had limited involvement in this action. All 
remaining claims (with the exception of a request for attorney's 
fees) were against Utelite. Summit County did not conduct 
discovery or, aside from attending certain depositions, otherwise 
represent its interests in the dispute because it had no direct 
stake in the remaining claims. 
The trial court twice heard motions by the plaintiff to add 
the road/access claims, which are the heart of the proposed third 
amended complaint, to the action. R. 782 and 916. The court 
consistently ruled that the amendment required the involvement of 
a new party, the Railroad, which would significantly delay the 
three and one-half year old proceedings. The trial court also 
noted that "the plaintiffs can obtain the additional relief they 
seek by filing a new civil action in this Court." R. 1028-29. 
The addition of the road/access claims would directly 
implicate the property rights of the Railroad over whose property 
the alleged public road passed. A finding for the plaintiffs 
would render a portion of the Railroad's property a public road. 
The Railroad had not participated in the discovery preceding the 
motion and Summit County's participation was limited. The claims 
in the proposed third amended complaint would have greatly 
broadened the basic case for nuisance and trespass actually set 
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forth in the governing pleadings. See Second Amended Complaint 
dated March 11, 1994, R. 304-42. 
The plaintiffs insist that the claims in their amended 
pleading were already the subject of discovery in the action. The 
fact that, at a deposition, a party chooses to explore or a 
witness chooses to discuss matters of fact not set forth in the 
pleadings does not serve to amend those pleadings nor does it 
compel the trial court to permit an amendment that is otherwise 
untimely and prejudicial. In the final analysis, the denial of 
the motion to amend caused the plaintiffs no harm and had no 
effect on the result at trial. The sole plaintiffs with an 
interest in the access claims, Richard Richins and the Dicker 
Hill Trust, were at liberty to file a separate action against all 
affected parties. They have never done so. 
X. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ADMIT EVIDENCE REGARDING 
ACCESS AND THE ALLEGED "PUBLIC" ROAD WAS NOT ERROR AND DID 
NOT AFFECT THE RESULT AT TRIAL. 
The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs Richins and 
Dicker Hill Trust could not introduce evidence at trial of their 
alleged loss of access to property via a public road. In their 
brief, the plaintiffs correctly note that this exclusion of 
evidence flowed from the trial court's earlier refusal to grant 
leave to file the proposed third amended complaint, which 
included claims for loss of access. 
The plaintiffs claim that "lack of access was a basis for 
the pending nuisance claim.w Appellees' Brief, p. 45. Yet, they 
cannot cite to a single allegation in their Second Amended 
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Complaint that places access or the public of the road in issue. 
In reality, the plaintiffs Richins and Dicker Hill Trust have 
reasonable access to their property. They merely resent the 
occasional brief wait at the Facility when trucks were unloading. 
(Appellants' Addendum A-6 at Finding 8(c).) 
The plaintiffs have further failed to proffer the evidence 
they would have offered. Absent such a proffer, this Court 
cannot determine whether the exclusion of that evidence affected 
the result at trial. See Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 
1987); Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing. Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 
1990) and Utah R. Civ. P. 61. 
XI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN ALLOWING THE JURY 
TO VIEW THE FACILITY IN OPERATION. 
Rule 47 (j) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes 
the trial court to permit the jury to view "property which is the 
subject of litigation11 when "it is proper . . . .w H*There is a 
presumption as to the correctness of the trial judge's ruling in 
the absence of a demonstration to the contrary, and that decision 
will not be upset absent a clear abuse of discretion.,M State v. 
Cabututan. 861 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1993) citing 75 Am.Jur.2d 
Trial § 259 (1991). 
On Utelite's motion, Judge Noel ruled that the jury could 
visit the Facility and observe it in operation. He tied his 
granting of the motion to the plaintiffs' insistence that the 
Facility remained a nuisance at the time of trial: 
If Mr. Warlaumont [the plaintiffs' counsel] feel that 
the only issue in the case is past damages, your 
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objection would be well taken. In light of all of 
the changes and the very recent changes, I think it's 
probative on the issue of current damages, present 
lost property values, and so I think the current 
situation is probative and I think that the Court can 
somewhat overcome the problems that you've mentioned 
by instructing the jury on those issues, which the 
Court intends to do right now. R. 2664-65. 
The Court then gave the jury the following instructions 
with respect to the jury view: 
As I indicated to you yesterday, we're going to 
take you down to the site of this loading facility 
and let you observe it in operation from the vantage 
point of some of the properties involved in this 
litigation. 
I have a couple of instructions that I would 
like to give you before we go down there and that is, 
number one, as you view this facility today, you must 
keep in mind that this is how the facility operates 
today under the current conditions and under all of 
the changes that have been made. And some of the 
testimony has been fairly recent. 
And under today's current weather and time of 
year and so forth, you must keep that in mind and 
it's how it operates today, not necessarily how it 
operated in the past or will operate in the future. 
For that, you need to rely upon the statements 
and testimony from the witness stand that you will 
hear during the course of this trial. So, bear that 
in mind. (R. 2665-66.) 
With these instructions freshly in mind, on September 14, 
1995, at the commencement of the third day of trial, the jury 
visited the Facility and observed its operation. The plaintiffs 
had full opportunity, both before and after the visit, to explain 
to the jury any differences between conditions at the time of the 
visit and conditions on other occasions. To this end, the 
plaintiffs played for the jury a tape recording of the noise 
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generated by the operation of the Facility (R. 2408) and 
presented a video of the Facility in operation on a windy day 
(R. 2421# 2435, 2464, 2509-11, -13). 
The plaintiff Cattelan testified at length regarding 
photographs he had taken of various allegedly adverse conditions 
at the Facility. (R. 2578-86.) He testified from extensive 
written logs that he had maintained noting noise and dust 
problems over the six and one-half years of operation. 
(R. 2587-4.) Further, each plaintiff was permitted to estimate 
the alleged diminution to the value of their property, as of the 
date of trial, arising from the operation of the Facility. (See, 
e.g., R. 2437-42, 2464-67, 2593-2607.) 
For its part, Utelite offered evidence from various 
witnesses that the conditions observed at the Facility on 
September 14, 1995, were not atypical. (R. 2797, 2921, 2929, 
2939-42, 2953-54 and Ex. 125, 2964-69, 2976-80, 3015-17.) These 
witnesses included a trucker who operated the Facility, two 
persons who worked daily in the vicinity of the plaintiffs' 
property, a former resident of Echo who made frequent visits to 
the town, Utelite's environmental expert, the head of the County 
Health Department, and a state environmental regulator. (The 
last named witness also explained the distortions resulting from 
the use of photographs to evaluate visual emissions. R. 2968, 
2973.) 
Seen in this context, the plaintiffs' "strenuous objection11 
to the jury's view of the Facility in operation rings hollow. 
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(Appellees' Brief, p. 45.) The plaintiffs alleged a continuing 
nuisance for six and one-half years up to the date of trial. 
They complained at length of ongoing dust and noise from the 
operation. Yet, they insisted that actually seeing the Facility 
in operation, where noise and dust could not be disguised, might 
mislead to the jury. Where one claims the existence of a 
nuisance at the time of trial, observation of current operations 
is relevant and not misleading. Obviously, in the context of a 
claim that the nuisance has been continuous over a period of six 
and one-half years, no single visit or video or photo will be 
entirely typical. However, it is not enough to object just 
because a visit to the site may not support the plaintiffs' 
allegations. 
XII. THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT THE FACILITY IS NOT 
PRESENTLY A NUISANCE WAS NOT CLEAR ERROR. 
The plaintiffs have challenged Judge Noel's determination 
that the Facility is not presently a nuisance. As already noted, 
they have failed to marshall the evidence to show the absence of 
credible evidence to support the trial court's Findings. What 
the plaintiffs ask this Court to do is to substitute their view 
of conflicting proof for that of Judge Noel reached after review 
of all the evidence. 
The plaintiffs have further failed to identify specific 
Findings for which there is no support in the record. Findings 1 
and 2 were confirmed by the site visit and never were in serious 
dispute. (R. 2813.) Findings 3 through 5 were established by 
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the testimony of Kip Bigelow, Utelite's business manager, who 
scheduled the loading. (R. 3005-09.) Carsten Mortensen, 
Utelite's president, testified in detail with respect to each 
item set forth in Findings 6 through 8. (R. 2855-64.) The 
plaintiff Jane Harper confirmed that many of these improvements 
had occurred. (R. 2480-83.) The sole remaining Finding was 
based on the prior Findings as confirmed by the trial court's own 
knowledge through the review of the video, the tape and the 
photographs together with the site visit. In short, Judge Noel 
chose to believe Utelite and to disregard the plaintiffs' 
numerous complaints. He properly denied further injunctive 
relief. 
XIII. THE JURY'S VERDICT ON PAST DAMAGES ARISING FROM UTELITE'S 
OPERATIONS AT THE FACILITY IS BINDING IN ALL FUTURE 
PROCEEDINGS WITH RESPECT TO LIABILITY. 
Judge Noel relied on Judge Wilkinson's partial summary 
judgment to hold Utelite liable as a matter of law under the 
doctrine of nuisance per se. (Appellants' A-5 at 1-2.) Only the 
issues of causation and damages, actual and punitive, vent to the 
jury. The plaintiffs had full opportunity to present evidence to 
the jury of their damages and of conduct by Utelite that might 
merit an award of punitives. 
Confronted with claims for damages spanning over six years 
and exceeding $500,000 and additional claims for punitives, the 
jury chose to award $5,000 each to the Harpers, $2,500 to the 
plaintiff Cattelan and $1,500 to the plaintiffs Richins and 
Dicker Hill Trust. The jury found that there had been no 
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reduction in the value of the plaintiffs' property and no loss of 
business income• The jury further found that the plaintiffs were 
not entitled to an award of punitive damages. 
If this Court reverses the partial summary judgment or 
finds that Judge Noel erroneously applied the doctrine of 
nuisance per se, the plaintiffs must try the issue of liability 
in order to establish a basis for recovering damages. Should 
they prevail thereafter on claims of nuisance, trespass, 
negligence or even intentional infliction of emotional harm, the 
plaintiffs' recovery for the time period prior to September 15, 
1995, is limited to the damages assessed by the jury at the trial 
of this action. All damages potentially recoverable for these 
claims are included in the broad damages available under the 
theory of nuisance presented to the jury. See generally, Branch 
v. Western Petroleum. Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982). 
Obviously, were this Court to direct that the road/access 
issue be included in further proceedings (or if the plaintiffs 
separately pursue that issue as directed by Judge Brian), the 
plaintiffs could recover separate damages arising from that 
specific claim. The road/access issue was not tried and is 
distinct from the damages awarded at trial. 
Whatever the outcome of other issues on appeal, the jury's 
finding on damages is binding on the parties in all further 
proceedings. There is no legal basis to give the plaintiffs a 
second bite at that apple. If Utelite is ultimately adjudged 
liable to the plaintiffs for wrongful conduct before 
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September 15, 1995, the jury has set the precise amount of each 
plaintiff's recovery. 
This Court should vacate the partial summary judgment 
against Summit County and the judgment of liability against 
Utelite. If this Court cannot rule as a matter of law on the 
record before it that Summit County acted within its discretion 
in viewing the Facility as an accessory use to the Railroad's 
valid nonconforming use at Echo, then this action must be 
remanded to the trial court for resolution of all disputed issues 
of fact. _, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ' 0 day of February, 1997. 
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